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Executive Summary
This paper develops four propositions that show thatchanges in the global job
market for science and engineering (S&E) workersare eroding U.S. dominance
in S&E, which diminishes comparative advantagein high tech production and
creates problems for American industry and workers:
The U.S. share of the world's science andengineering graduates is declin-
ing rapidly as European and Asian universities,particularly from China, have
increased S&E degrees while U.S. degree productionhas stagnated.
The job market has worsened foryoung workers in S&E fields relative to
many other high-level occupations, which discourages U.S.students from
going on in S&E, but which still has sufficient rewardsto attract large immi-
grant flows, particularly from developing countries.
Populous low income countries suchas China and India can compete with
the U.S. in high tech by havingmany S&E specialists although those workers
are a small proportion of their work forces. This threatens to undo the"North-
South" pattern of trade in which advancedcountries dominate high tech while
developing countries specialize in less skilledmanufacturing.
Diminished comparative advantage in high-tech willcreate a long period of
adjustment for U.S. workers, of which the offshoringof IT jobs to India, growth
of high-tech production in China, and multinationalR&D facilities in develop-
ing countries, are harbingers.
To ease the adjustment to a less dominantposition in science and engineering,
the U.S. will have to developnew labor market and R&D policies that build
on existing strengths and develop new ways of benefiting fromscientific and
technological advances in other countries.I.Introduction
For the past half century the U.S.has been the world scientific and tech-
nological leader and the pre-eminentmarket economy. With just 5 per-
cent of the world's population, theU.S. employs nearly one-third of the
world's scientific and engineeringresearchers, accounts for 40 percent
of research and development (R&D)spending, publishes 35 percent of
science and engineering (S&E)articles, obtains 44 percent of S&E cita-
tions, and wins numerous Nobelprizes.1 Seventeen of the world's top
20 universities are American.2Indicative of U.S. leadership, interna-
tional students and scholars flock to the countryto enhance their skills
and collaborate with Americanresearchers.
Leadership in science and technology givesthe U.S. its comparative
advantage in the global economy. U.S. exports aredisproportionately
from sectors that rely extensively onscientific and engineering work-
ers and that embody the newesttechnologies. In 2003, with a massive
national trade deficit, the smallest deficitrelative to output was in high
technology industries. Aggregate measuresof scientific and technologi-
cal prowess place the U.S. at the topof global rankings.3
Trade aside, the U.S. is the leadingcapitalist economy because it
applies new knowledge in more sectorsthan any other economy. Many.
companies on the technological frontier areAmerican multinationals:
IBM, Microsoft, Intel, Dupont and so on.Analysts attribute the coun-
try's rapid productivity growth in the1990s/2000s to the adaptation
of new information and communicationtechnologies to production.
Scientific and technological preeminence isalso critical to the nation's
defense, as evidenced by the employmentof R&D scientists and engi-
neers in defense relatedactivities and in the technological dominance
of the U.S. military on battlefields. To be sure,other factors also contrib-
ute to U.S. economic leadership,4but in a knowledge-based economy,
leadership in science and technologycontributes substantially to eco-
nomic success.
This paper presents evidence that changesin the global job market
for S&E workers is eroding U.S. dominancein science and engineering
and that the erosion will continue into theforeseeable future, diminish-
ing the country's comparativeadvantage in high tech goods and ser-
vices and threatening the country'sglobal economic leadership. The
paper assesses policiesthat could smooth the transition fromthe U.S.
being the superpower in science andengineering to being one of many
centers of excellence.
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The analysis can be summarized in four propositions,two relating to
the job market for scientific and engineering talent,and two relating to
the effects of that market on theeconomy.
The propositions regarding the science andengineering (S&E) job
market are:
The U.S. share of the world's science andengineering graduates
at all degree levels is declining rapidly,as college enrollments have
expanded in other countries. The number of S&E PhDs fromEuropean
and Asian universities, particularly from China,has increased while
the number from U.S. universities has stagnated.International students
have, in addition, increased their share of advancedS&E degrees from
U.S. universities. As a result U.S. relianceon foreign-born scientists and
engineers has increased.
The job market for young scientists andengineers in the U.S. has
worsened relative to job markets foryoung workers in many other
high-level occupations, which discourages U.S.students from going on
in these fields. At the same time, rewardsare sufficient to attract large
immigrant flows, particularly from less developedcountries.
The propositions regarding the impact of changesin the supply of
science and engineering talent on the country'seconomic performance
are:
By increasing the number of scientists and engineers,highly popu-
lous low income countries suchas China and India can compete with
the U.S. in technically advanced industrieseven though S&E workers
are a small proportion of their work forces. This threatens to undo the
traditional "North-South" pattern of trade in whichadvanced coun-
tries dominate high tech while developing countriesspecialize in less
skilled manufacturing.
Diminished comparative advantage in high-tech willcreate adjust-
ment problems for U.S. workers, of which the offshoring ofIT jobs to
India, growth of high-tech production andexports from China, and
multinational movement of R&D facffities to developingcountries, are
harbingers. The country facesa long transition to a less dominant posi-
tion in science and engineering associated industries,for which the U.S.
will have to develop new labor market and R&Dpolicies that build on
existing strengths and develop newways of benefiting from scientific
and technological advances in other countries.Freeman 126
The rest of the paper presents the evidenceand arguments for the
four propositions and examines the implicationsfor policy.
II.Proposition 1: The U.S. Share of the World's S&EWork Force Is
Declining Rapidly
The U.S. share of the world's S&E workers wasdisproportionately high,
in the latter half of the20th century for historical reasons that include:
the flight of many leading European scientistsfrom the Nazis; the slow
post-World War TI recovery of higher educationand science in Europe,
which had dominated science before theWar; the rapid expansion of
mass college education inthe U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s; increased U.S.
spending on R&D and doctorate S&E educationin response to Sputnik;
the concentration of Soviet science andengineering on military technol-
ogy; and the destructiveeffects of the cultural revolution on education
in China. Tn 1970 U.S. predominance wassuch that the country enrolled
approximately 30 percent of tertiary level studentsin the world. Over
half of science and engineering doctorates weregranted by U.S. institu-
tions of higher education.
Since then the rest of the world hasbegun to catch up with the U.S.
in higher education and in educatingS&E specialists in particular. The
number of young persons going to collegehas increased rapidly in
other OECD countries and in many lessdeveloped countries, particu-
larly China. Enrollments in college oruniversity per person aged 20-24
and/or the ratio of degrees granted per 24 yearold and in several OECD
countries (Australia, New Zealand,Netherlands, Norway, Finland, the
United Kingdom and France) exceeded that inthe U.S.5 In 2001-2002,
UNCESCO data show that the U.S. enrolled just14 percent of tertiary
level studentsless than half the U.S. share30 years earlier.6 Tn most
countries, moreover, a larger proportion ofcollege students studied sci-
ence and engineering thanin the U.S., so that the U.S. share of students
in those fields was considerably lowerthan the U.S. share overall. Tn
2000, 17 percent of all universitybachelor's degrees in the U.S. were in
the natural sciences and engineering compared to aworld average of 27
percent of degrees, and to 52 percentof degrees in China.7
At the graduate level, the PhD is thecritical degree in science, par-
ticularly for advanced research activities.Exhibit 5.1 records the ratios
of PhDs earned in science and engineeringin major PhD producing
countries relative to the numbers grantedin the U.S. from 1975 to 2001
and extrapolates the numbers to 2010. PhDsin science and engineeringFor 2003 and 2010, ratios calculated using U.S.doctorates at 2001 production level.
'diaspora' includes estimates of Chinese doctoralgraduates from UK, Japan, and U.S.
(with temporary visas). U.S. 'stayers' includeU.S. citizens and permanent residents.
EU data extrapolated from earlieryears.
Sources: NSF Science and Engineering Indicators2004, and primary sources referenced
therein; Song and Xuan, National ResearchCenter for S&T Development (China) pri-
vate communication.
outside the U.S. rise sharply whereas thenumber granted in the U.S.
stabilizes at about 18,000per year. In 2001 the EU granted 40 percent
more S&E PhDs than the U.S. Trend data suggest that theEU will pro-
duce nearly twice as many S&E doctoratesas the U.S. by 2010 or so.
But the greatest growth is in China. In 1975China produced almostno
S&E doctorates. In 2003, thecountry graduated 13,000 PhDs, approxi-
mately 70 percent in science andengineering. Between 1995 and 2003,
first year entrants in PhDprograms in China increased six-fold, from
8,139 to 48,740. At this rate China willproduce more S&E doctorates
than the U.S. by 2010! The quality ofdoctorate education surely suffers
from such expansion,so the numbers should be discounted tosome
extent, but as the new doctorateprograms develop, the discount factor
will decline.
Overall, the U.S. share of world S&EPhDs will fall to about 15 percent
by 2010. Within the U.S.,moreover, international students have come to
earn an increasing proportion of S&E PhDs. In 1966,U.S.-born males
accounted for 71 percent of science andengineering PhDs awarded;
6 percent were awarded to U.S.-bornfemales; and 23 percentwere
awarded to the foreign-born. In 2000, 36percent of S&E PhDs went
to U.S.-born males, 25 percent to U.S.-bornfemales and 39 percent to
the foreign-born. Lookingamong the S&E fields, in 2002, international
students received 19.5 percent of all doctoratesawarded in the social
and behavioral sciences, 18.0percent in the life sciences, 35.4 percent in
(Ratio of PhDs in each year) 1975 1989 20012003'2010'
Asia major nations 0.22 0.48 0.96
China na 0.05 0.32 0.49 1.26
Japan 0.11 0.16 0.29
EU major (Fr, Germ, UK) 0.64 0.84 1.07
All EU 0.93 1.22 1.54 1.62' 1.92'
Chinese 'diaspora' versus U.S. 'stayers'
(estimate)
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Exhibit 5.1
Ratio of # S&E PhDs from foreign universitiesto # fromSource: 1990 and 2000 bachelor's, masters,PhD and PhDs less than 45 years of age, tabu-
lated from Census of Population, IPUMS data;Post-Docs from NSF.
2004 figures tabulated from U.S. Bureauof Census, Current Population Survey, MORG
Files.
Post-Doc, NSF, http://w.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seifld04/C2/fig02265 where the figures
refer to temporary residents rather than toforeign born.
1LCILt ilL iJ])f,LL ------------ - ±-
1990 2000 2004
Bachelor's 11% 17% 17%
Masters 19% 29% 32%
All PhD 24% 38% 37%
PhDs <45 27% 52% -
Post-Doc 49% 57% -
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the physical sciences, and 58.7 percentin engineering.9 Since few U.S.
students earn S&E PhDs overseas, moreover,the ratio of S&E PhDs
earned by U.S. citizens or residents to thoseearned by citizens of other
countries fell more rapidly thanthe ratio of degrees granted by U.S.
universities to degrees granted by foreignuniversities.10
Finally, the foreign-born share of scienceand engineering degrees
earned in the U.S. is also substantialfor master's and bachelor's gradu-
ates. For physics, 6 percentof bachelor's degrees, 40 percent ofmaster's
degrees, and 42 percent of PhD degreeswent to foreign-born students
in 2003.11 Among engineers, 42percent of master's degreesand 49
percent of graduate students(most of whom are non-PhDstudents)
were foreign-born/heldtemporary visas in2001/2002.12 The U.S. share
of world bachelor's engineeringdegrees grantedthe key degree in
engineeringdropped in half in the1990sfrom approximately 12
percent in 1991 to 6 percent in2oo0u
Employment
The U.S. recruits its graduate S&Ework force from three sources: U.S.-
born residents who choose S&E careers,international students who stay
in the country after earningU.S. degrees; and scientists and engineers
who earn degrees overseas andimmigrate to the country.14 Exhibit5.2
records the number employed in scienceand engineering occupations
from the 1990 and 2000 Censusesof Population and in the 2004 Current
Population Survey (CPS), MergedOutgoing Rotation group files. The
Census data show that in 2000,the foreign-born made up 17 percent
Exhibit 5.2
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of bachelor's S&E workers, 29percent of master's S&E workers, and
38 percent of the PhD S&Eworkforcehuge increases over thecom-
parable proportions in 1990. Indicativeof the future, the foreign-born
made up over half of doctoratescientists and engineers under theage
of 45 in 2000 and 57 percent ofpost-doctorate workers. Nearly 60per-
cent of the growth in the number of PhDscientists and engineers in the
country in the 1990s came from the foreignborn. The CPS data show
comparable percentages of foreign-bornfor bachelor's and doctorate
degree employees, buta higher proportion of the foreign bornamong
master's degree recipients.
Since neither the CPSnor the Census ask where someone earned their
degree, these data do not distinguishbetween international students
who chose to stay in the U.S. andimmigrants who come with foreign
degrees. At the doctorate level, theSurvey of Earned Doctorates shows
that many international studentsintend to remain in the U.S. towork
after they graduate. This is particularlytrue for students from develop-
ing countries, where earningsare lower and scientific facilities are not
at U.S. level. Michael Finn has estimatedthat in the 2001 PhD graduates
cohort, 71 percent of foreign-borndoctorates remained in the United
States for at least 2 years. Thiscompares to an estimated stay rate of 49
percent for the 1989 cohort. PhDs fromChina are especially likely to
remain in the country.'5
But immigrants with foreign degreesare also quite important. The
2000 Census reported a much highernumber of foreign-born S&E
workers than did the NSF's SESTATdata system,16 because the latter
counts foreign-born recipients of U.S. degreesbut not immigrants with
overseas degrees between Censal years.'7 Amongpostdoctorate work-
ers, who are a critical input in nearly all laboratories,about four-fifths
of academic postdoctoral scholarsholding temporary visas havenon-
U.S. doctorates and around halfof all academic postdoctoral scholars
have non-U.S. doctorates.'8
Finally, indicative of the growingreliance on the foreign born, NSF
data show that foreign-born facultywho earned their doctoral degrees
at U.S. universities increased in numberfrom 12 percent in 1973 to 20
percent in 1999. In engineering fields theyincreased from 18.6 percent
to 34.7 percent in the same period.'9
Trade-offs in Supplies
Because changes in the supply fromone source affects the total number
of S&E workers in the market, thosechanges necessarily impactearn-130
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ings and employmentopportunities (Freeman 1971, 1975,1976; Borjas
2003). An increase in the supplyof immigrant S&E workers will,all else
the same, reduce earningsand employment opportunitiesbelow what
they otherwise would havebeen, thus lowering the incentivesfor per-
sons from that andfrom other sources to enter theS&E job market. The
supply of U.S. born/residents,particularly men, to science and engi-
neering appears to be moreresponsive to labor market conditionsthan
the supply of the foreign born.This reflects the fact that U.S. bornhave
access to other careersin the country, whereas scienceand engineering
careers may be the only wayfor many talented foreign-born persons to
enter the U.S. job market.The ability to recruit internationalstudents
and immigrant scientists andengineers for the U.S. S&E jobmarket
benefits the country by tapping alarge and relatively inexpensivepool
of talent at the cost of reducedincentives for native-born individuals to
go on in scienceand engineering.
Trends in demographyand in PhDproduction rates outside the U.S.
will reduce the U.S. share ofS&E graduates at all degree levels.Assum-
ing comparable trainingand ability around the world, U.S.firms and
universities who seek the mosttalented people will increase the foreign
born share of their workforces in the future. But evenwith a sizable
immigration of foreign-born talent tothe country, the demographic
forces will invariably reduce theshare of science and engineering spe-
cialists working in the U.S.,which should reduce the country'sdomi-
nance of scienceand technology.
Data on publications andcitations by country of investigatorshow
that the U.S. predominancehas already begun to drop in many areas.
In spring 2004, the front pageof The New York Times reported afall in
the U.S. share of papers inphysics journals while Naturereported a
rise in the share of papers inChina.20 The NSF records a drop in theU.S.
share of scientific papers from38 percent in 1988 to 31 percent in2001
and a drop in the U.S. shareof citations from 52 percent in 1992 to44
percent.21 The share of paperscounted in the Chemical Abstract Service
fell from 73 percent in 1980 to 40percent in 2003.22 While attentionhas
focused on the increased scientificcapability of China,23 Latin American
countries have also increasedtheir share of science publications.24One
aspect of the fall in the U.S. sharethat has attracted attention is thatit
has been associated with adecline in publications in somedisciplines
from U.S.-based scientists andengineers (Hicks 2004). As the U.S.share
of the world's S&E specialistsfalls, it is inevitable that the U.S.share
of papers will fall; but there is no reasonfor numbers of papers to fall,
given the increased numbersof journals.Does Globalization Threaten U.S.Economic Leadership? 131
Similarly, as the supply of S&Egraduates has increasedoverseas,
many high-tech companies have begun to locatemajor research instal-
lations outside the U.S. In 2004, theCEO of Cisco declared that "Cisco
is a Chinese company" when heannounced that the firm was setting
up its newest R&D facility in China.26 One of Microsoft'smajor research
facilities is in Beijing. OECD datashows a large increase in U.S.out-
ward R&D investment from 1994to 2000. A 2004 survey of corporate
executives by the Intelligence Unit of TheEconomist found that the five
top countries in which firms intendedto increase R&D outside of their
home country were China, the U.S.,India, the UK and Germany. The
three most critically important factorscited by executives when select-
ing R&D locales were "local R&Dexpertise in your industry," followed
by "availability of R&D scientistswith appropriate skills," and "costof
labour of R&D."27 As of mid 2004,the Chinese government registered
over 600 multinational research facilities in thecountry, many from
large U.S. multinationals.28 Bycontrast, in 1997 China registered less
than 50 multinational corporationresearch centers.
III.Proposition 2: Despite Perennial Concernsover Shortages
of Scientific and EngineeringSpecialists, the Job Market in Most
S&E Specialties Is Too Weakto Attract Increasing Numbers of
U.S. Students
Every few years or so, the scientificestablishment and/or the topexec-
utives from major high technology firmsproclaim that the U.S. hasa
shortage of S&E workers and callfor diverse policies to attractmore
Americans into the fields and/orto make it easier to bring foreign S&E
workers into the country.
Economists have struggled to interpretclaims that the U.S. hada
shortage of scientific and engineeringworkers since the l950s, when
such claims first surfaced. Inany market-clearing transaction where
wages equilibrate demand and supply, therecan no "shortage" or
"surplus." There is disappointmentabout the price, either by suppli-
ers (when a "surplus" reduces prices)or by demanders (when a "short-
age" raises price), thatcan generate longer run responses in the form of
investment to increase the supplyor substitution of alternative inputs
for the high-priced input. Arrowand Capron interpreted shortagesas
the result of sluggishwage adjustments. Blank and Stigler interpreted
them as reflecting rapid changes inwages. Freeman stressed the cyclic
nature of shortages and surpluses in thecontext of a cobweb model of
market adjustment.132
Source: Tabulations from U.S. Censusof Population, IPUMS Data, 1990, 2000.
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Wages are not, however, theonly equilibrating force or indicatorof
the state of the labor market. Inthe market for researchers, theduration
of postdoctoral work beforeobtaining a full-time job, theprobability of
getting an independentresearch grant, or of landing a tenuretrack job
at an institution of givenquality, etc, are also importantmechanisms for
market adjustment. In a loose labormarket, young persons are likely to
spend more years as post-docs atlow post-doctorate pay than in atight
labor market. In 2001 the AmericanInstitute of Physics proclaimed"The
Physics Job Market: From Bear toBull in a Decade: What a difference8
years makes" andused a graph that showed fewer newphysics doctor-
ates taking post-docs and moregetting jobs to make its point.29New
PhDs pay close attention tothe quality of academic institutionsmaking
job offers. In a tight market, graduatesend up in highly esteemed labs
or universities. Inloose markets, they accept jobsin places judged as
lower quality.
Whichever indicator one examines,the evidence suggests that the
job market for most scientistsand engineers in the U.S. has fallenshort
of the job markets in competitivehigh level occupations. Exhibit5.3
records levels of pay and ratesof change in pay from the Censusof
Population. It shows that scientistsand engineers earn less than law
and medical school graduates,and that rates of increase in earningsfor
science and engineering in the1990s fell short of the rates of increasefor
doctors and lawyers and for personswith bachelor's degrees.
Exhibit 5.3
-rF dcThirs and nercent change in income,1990-2000
JLLLU1fltCILLLLLt]&'-"" .. - _
1990 2000 % Change
PhD
Engineering $64.6 91.1 41.0
Mathematics 58.3 86.6 48.5
Natural Science 56.3 73.0 29.7
Social Science 54.2 74.6 37.6
Life Science 45.6 62.7 37.5
MD 98.8 156.4 58.3
Lawyer 76.9 114.7 49.2
Managers , college + 2 years 61.3 84.9 38.5
College Grads, 4 years only 30.8 46.9 52.2Does Globalization Threaten U.S. EconomicLeadership? 133
The Census comparisons of the incomebetween S&E doctorates and
persons obtaining medical or law professional degreesunderstate the
lower income associated with the PhDtrajectory. Doctoral graduate stu-
dents typically spend seven to eightyears earning their PhDa quarter
of their post-bachelors working lifeduringwhich they are paid sti-
pend rates. In some disciplines, notably thelife sciences, most spend
three or so years doing postdoctoralwork, again at stipend incomes that
fall far below alternative salariesavailable to bachelor's degree holders
or those with professional degrees. Since postdocswork many hours,
their pay is particularly lowon an hourly basis for someone with their
years of education. Given their lengthy training andpost-doctoral work,
many S&E doctorates do not enter the "real job market"until they are
in their mid-30s, by which timemany of their undergraduate classmates
who chose other careersare well-established in their work lives. The
comparison with managers with twoyears of post-bachelor's training
does not adequately reflect the payoffto MBAs since the post-bachelor's
education refers to any sort of furthereducation, not to that degree.
The differences in the percentagechanges in salaries in exhibit 5.3
show that the doctorate fields have hadsmaller gains in salaries than
the professional fields andpersons with only bachelor's training,
though the increases are similaror larger than those for the managers
with two years post-baccalaureateschooling, depending on the PhD
field. Smaller increases inpay for doctorates in general imply that the
market for PhDs was falling behind themarkets for other groups of
highly educated workers.
Combining the pay differences betweendoctorate scientists and engi-
neers and highly educated workers in other fields togetherwith the
difference in years of education andpost-doctorate training produces
huge differences in lifetime earnings.Translating Census of Population
earnings by age group, per the data in exhibit 5.3,into lifetime incomes,
discounted at 5 percent, biologicalscientists had lifetime earningon
the order of 3 million dollars lessover their lifetime than doctors and
1.8 million dollars less than lawyers. Doctorsand lawyers pay for their
education, while PhD scientists receivefellowships or stipends and
rarely pay tuition, though they often work fortheir fellowship support,
but this hardly equates the lifetimeearnings. Physicists and mathemati-
cians had higher discounted lifetime earningsthan biological scientists,
while engineers had the highestearnings among PhDs, but even those
earnings fall considerably short of the earnings ofdoctors.134
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Looking beyond salaries, thedemographics of the academic job mar-
ket made it increasingly difficultfor doctorate graduates to obtainfac-
ulty jobs even as older scientistsretire. In 1973, roughly 73 percentof new
PhDs obtained faculty jobs withinthree years of earning their degrees.
By 1999, just 37 percent of newPhDs obtained faculty jobs withinthree
years of earning their degrees.To see how the demographics of thejob
market operates to determine theprobability of academic employment
in the life sciences, I havedeveloped a quantity adjustment modelof
demand and supply for new faculty, inwhich the proportion of post-
docs obtaining academic jobsrather than salary is the chief adjustment
mechanism. The demand side of themodel defines the number of per-
sons employed asfaculty as the sum of demand forreplacements for
retiring faculty plus demand fromgrowth of faculty, which occurs at r
percent per year. I assume steady state sothat the retirement of existing
faculty F is just 1/length of time of anacademic career, which I take to
be 30 years. Thus annualdemand for new academics is
F/30+.OrF.
(1)
On the supply side, there arepostdoctoral (PD) recipients, with post-
doctoral awards that last 3 years, sothe supply of postdocs to the aca-
demic job market is PD/3. In thesteady state one-third of post-docs
will complete their three yearaward and enter the job market. Letting
b measure the proportion ofpostdocs who obtain academic jobs,the
supply of new academics is:
bPD/3.
(2)
Setting (1) = (2), the market clearingproportion of post-docs who obtain
academic jobs is:
b = F/(10 PD) +3(.Or) F/PD = (1/10+.Or) F/PD. (3)
Exhibit 5.4 shows that the ratio ofpostdoctoral students to tenured
faculty rose greatly from 1987 to1999 to reach 0.77, which gives a
ratio of F/PD of 1.30. This impliesthat if faculty jobs were unchanged
(r = 0), just 13 percent of postdocswould find faculty positions (1 .30/10).
Even if the number of facultyjobs increased at 5 percent per year, just
20 percent of the postdocswould find faculty jobs. The implicationis
clear: a much smaller proportion oflife science post-docs will move
into academic jobs in the futurethan in the past. Universities andprin-
cipal investigators therefore have aresponsibility to prepare life science
PhDs and postdocs for jobsoutside of the standard academic track.Source: National Academy of Science, Enhancingthe Postdoctoral Experience for Scientists
and Engineers 2000, table B-14.
Since post-docs are lessconm-ion and the ratio of postdocs to faculty is
much smaller outside of the biologicalsciences, the potential for obtain-
ing academic jobs is much higher.Still, the model identifies the factors
that will determine the academicmarket in those fields as wellthe
rate of growth of new demand, retirements,and the ratio of graduates
to faculty
Finally, because NIH grantsare awarded to faculty members rather
than to postdoctorate scientists,the probability that young scientists
obtain grants to workas independent investigators has fallen toneg-
ligible numbers. Exhibit 5.5uses NIH data on the age distribution of
recipients of ROl grants, and theage distribution of doctorate life scien-
tists to show how the chancesyoung investigators would get theirown
grants fell sharply in the past 20or so years. These data show that the
Exhibit 5.5
Younger scientists don't get NIH grants
Source:
NIH: Erica Goldman and Eliot Marshall,"NIH Grantees: Where Have All the Young
Ones Gone?" Science Vol. 298 (5991) (October4,2002).
NSF: Characteristics of Doctoral Scientists andEngineers in the United States.
Discipline 1987 1999
Postdocs I Tenured %
Life Sciences 0.54 0.77 43%
Physical Sciences
Mathematics 0.20 0.19 5%
Engineering o.ii 0.16 45%
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Exhibit 5.4
Ratio of number of postdocs/number oftenured f20
enrollments in 000s
0
Source: Conuiiission on Engineeringand Technical Systems (1986) EngineeringInfrastruc-
ture Diagramming and Modeling;National Science Foundation, "UndergraduateEnroll-
ment in Engineering and EngineeringTechnology Programs."
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proportion given to scientists lessthan 35 years old fell from 23 percent
in 1980 to 4 percent in 2002whereas the proportion of grants going to
scientists aged 45 years and older rosefrom 22 percent to 60 percent.
Dividing these proportions by theproportion of doctorates in the rel-
evant age brackets gives therelative odds of obtairüng an ROlgrant.3°
The relative odds drop from 1.21 to0.30 for scientists less than 35 years
old. In 1980 they had a greaterchance of getting an award thanolder
scientists, whereas in 2002 theyhad a much smaller chance. The relative
odds rise for the oldest age groupof scientists.
Job Market for Bachelor's andMaster's Graduates
Is there any evidenceof shortages in the job market forbachelor's or
master's graduates in science andengineering?
The BS in engineering is the keyterminal bachelor's degree for sci-
entists and engineers. S&Eemployment in industry consistslargely of
bachelor's engineering graduates. Sincethe end of World War II, the job
market for engineers has shown cyclicoscillations of the cobweb vari-
ety (Freeman 1971, 1975,1976.) Exhibit 5.6 shows the variationin num-
bers enrolled as first year engineeringstudents from 1946 to 2001. Tight
Exhibit 5.6






40Does Globalization Threaten U.S. EconomicLeadership? 137
labor markets generate large increasesin supply that depress the labor
market approximately 4-5years later. Similar patterns are observed
in other fields. Starting salaries showthat engineers makemore than
other bachelor's graduates, with howevermarked differences among
specialties depending on how the industriesthat typically hire a given
specialty are doing and the number ofgraduates. Cycles aside, thepro-
portion of the work force in engineering hastrended upward, from 0.9
percent of the work force in 1950 to 1.8percent in 2003.' Engineering is
the largest S&E occupation, by far.
Scientists and engineers traditionallyhave low rates of unemploy-
ment and reasonably secure jobprospects. But in 2003 the unemploy-
ment rate for U.S. electrical and electronicsengineers (Ees) rose to a
record 6.2 percent, which exceeded theaverage unemployment rate
for all workers of 5.6 percent in thatyear.32 The 2003 jobless rate for
computer scientists and systems analysts alsoreached an all-time high
of 5.2 percent. Both unemploymentrates fell thereafter, though not to
historically low levels. Sincemany engineers who lose jobs are likely
to find other work relatively quicklyoutsidethe field and probably
at reduced earningsthe unemploymentrate understates the weak-
ness and risk involved in the job market forsome specialties. A more
striking indication of the weakness and riskin this job market is that
between 2000 and 2002 the Bureau ofLabor Statistics reduced itspro-
jections of the growth rate for employmentof computer specialists (and
mathematical scientists, a much smallergroup) by one half.33 It projects
about a million fewer jobs in thisarea in the next decade than it had
previously. The reason appears to be thegrowth in off shoring com-
puter work. This change in marketprospects highiights the riskiness
of S&E work in a globaleconomy where other countries are producing
many highiy skilled substitutes for U.S. workers.
Exhibit 5.2 showed a huge flow of immigrantscientists and engineers
with less than doctorate degrees.Some of this flow occurredas a result
of the issuance of Hi-B visas duringthe dot.com boom, whenmany
high-tech firms complained about labormarket shortages. But most
was generated by normal immigration patterns. Givenmuch larger
numbers of engineering graduates in foreigncountries, with huge
increases in graduates in India and China, thepooi of potential foreign-
born engineers is certain to increase.Although only a minority of these
graduates are likely to be suitable for thework performed by major
multinational firms, even a modestproportion of the increased supply
wifi give more firms the choice betweenhiring immigrant engineers138 Freeman
and scientists in their U.S. facilities orhiring foreign-born specialists in
their own countries.
If the labor market measures showthat the job market for scientists
and engineers has been relativelyweak, what explains the large influx
of international students andscientists and engineers from overseas
into the country?
One reason that foreign bornstudents and degree recipients are
attracted to science and engineering work inthe U.S. while many U.S.
citizens or permanent residentsdo not find that work attractive is
that the foreign-born have loweropportunity costs from other spe-
cialties than do Americatis. Thehigher average incomes in the U.S.,
particularly compared to developingcountries, and the greater dis-
persion of earnings in the U.S.,particularly compared to other high
income countries, means thatU.S. students, particularly the mostable,
have more lucrative non-S&E optionsthan do foreign-born students.
To many foreign-born students orworkers, obtaining an S&E educa-
tion or job is their ticket to theU.S. job market, a green card,and
possible citizenship. Their opportunitiesin their native country out-
side of science and engineering arefar less attractive than are the
opportunities outside of scienceand engineering to comparable
Americans.
Even the 1995-2004 doubling ofthe R&D budget for NIH did not
improve the well-being of newinvestigators enough to attract as
many U.S. students asforeign students into post-doctoratepositions
in the bio/medical sciences. From1995 to 2002, the number of Ameri-
cans acceptingpostdoctoral positions in the biological sciencesbarely
changed while the number of foreign-bornPhDs accepting postdoc-
toral appointments in the biologicalsciences increased. In medical and
other life sciences (which the NSFdata differentiate from biological sci-
ences), the number of citizens/permanentresidents accepting post-docs
increased modestly while the numberof foreign-born post-docs grew
by over 50 percent. As a result, theforeign-born share of postdoctoral
appointments in biological scienceand medical/other life sciences rose
from 48.0 percent (1995) to 54.7 percent(2002). At NIH itselfthe larg-
est single employer of scientistsin bio-medical research-46 percentof
the doctoral level staff wereforeign-born and 58 percent of the postdoc-
toral workers were foreign-born as ofOctober, 2004. And a substantial
number of U.S. passport holders at thedoctoral staff level at NIH were
themselves naturalized immigrants.35Does Globalization Threaten U.S. EconomicLeadership? 139
Women and Minorities
While proportionately fewer U.S.men have chosen science and engi-
neering careers, more women andunder-represented minorities have
chosen to major in science andengineering as undergraduates andto
go on to master's and doctorate degrees. Asa result the proportion
of bachelor's, masters and doctoratedegrees awarded towomen and
minorities in science and engineeringfields has trended upward from
the 1970s through the early 2000s,albeit at different rates in different
fields (Chang, Chiang, Freeman). In2004, women won 55percent of
National Science Foundation GraduateResearch Fellowships. The
increased numbers ofwomen earning science and engineering doctor-
ates is due more to increases in the numbersof women obtaining bache-
lor's degrees in these fields thanto increases in the propensity of female
bachelor's graduates togo on to PhDs. With women earning 57percent
of all bachelor's degrees in the early2000s and making up 63percent
of U.S. persons taking the GraduateRecord Exam, the proportion of
women with science and engineering degreesis likely to continue to
rise. Universities and other employerswill have to findways to make
careers in scientific work more consistent withwomen's role in family
life, particularly child-bearing andchild-rearing, if the country is going
to use this new source of talent optimally.
The increase in the number ofunder-represented minoritygroups
going on in science and engineering issubstantial as well. h-i 1976 blacks
and Hispanics earned barelytwo percent of S&E PhDs grantedto U.S.
citizens or residents, whereas in 2001they earned nearly tenpercent
of S&E PhDs granted to U.S.citizens or residents (Chang, Chiang,
Freeman).
Why have women and minorities chosento enter science and engi-
neering whereas white men have shiftedto other fields?
There are two possible explanations.The first is that the proportions
of women and minorities inscience and engineering in thepast was
low because S&E did not readilywelcome themimplicitor explicit
discrimination. The supply ofwomen and minorities was constrained
or discouraged. The increased proportionsare thus a movement toward
a new equilibrium that more properly reflectsinterests and talents. The
second is that the opportunitycost for women and minorities is lower
due to less attractiveopportunities in other high level occupations.For
women, the large increase in the numbers inmedical and law schoolsargues against thisfactor being as important as thenational effort to
equalize opportunities and increasediversity in S&E fields. Whatever
the particular causes, it isstriking that without an overallimprove-
ment in the overall S&E jobmarket, more women and minoritieshave
obtained S&E degrees and enteredS&E occupations.
Reconciling the Data and the ShortageClaims
Since labor market measuresshow no evidence of shortagesof S&E
workers, is there any way tomake sense of continued claimsthat the
U.S. has a shortage of scientistsand engineers and of calls for more
young Americans toenter these fields rather thanothers? How can
there be a shortage that does notshow up in the job marketashort-
age that is not ashortage?
One interpretation of thecontinual claims of a shortage is thatthey
are disingenuous. Firmsbenefit from a greater supply ofscientists and
engineers at given wage rates, orbetter yet, at lower wage rates.Hi-B
visas allowed firms to hiretrained specialists without the pay risesthat
would be necessary to attract moreU.S. workers. Foreign-born students
and post-docs allow principal investigatorsto produce research at rela-
tively low cost. The greater thesupply of post-docs at current pay,the
more cost-effective isU.S. research spending. In the 1980s,NSF forecast
shortages of scientists and engineerswith the seeming goal of increasing
supplies so that U.S. firms couldhire scientists and engineers at lower
wages. CongressionalHearings, which highlighted theseforecasts, pro-
duced editorials in Science andNature, and an apology from NSFthat
has made all analysts dubiousof shortage claims (Weinstein).
A second interpretation,which I think more accurately captures cur-
rent concerns, is that theU.S. has an adequate supply ofscientists and
engineers only because of thesizeable influx of foreign-born students
and employees. If U.S. economicgrowth and comparative advantage
depend substantially on the work ofscientific and engineering workers,
relying so much on foreign bornsupplies could be risky. Any interrup-
tion or change in the flow ofimmigrant scientists and engineerswould
certainly harm U.S. research anddevelopment. Imagine NIHwithout
foreign-born post-docs and scientists.Imagine the labs at any major
university or high tech firm withoutforeign-born students. Half of the
benches would be empty. Fromthis perspective1 the call for moreU.S.
students to go into science andengineering reflects a belief that thebal-
ance between thesupply of U.S. born and of foreign-bornscientists and
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engineers may have tilted too muchtoward the latter. It is nota shortage
of scientists and engineers but ofU.S. entrants into the field. Butmany
of the persons and firms who makethese arguments do not faceup to
the potential trade-off issue: thatto attract more U.S. citizens, earnings
and employment opportunities haveto get better, which is difficultto
effectuate as long as thecountry can attract many scientists andengi-
neers from overseas at current wages and employmentopportunities.
IV.Proposition 3: Technological Edge andGlobal Competition
When Numbers Count
Trade models designed to explainthe extensive tradeamong advanced
countries with similar factor endowmentsposit that the tradeoccurs
because countries gain advantagesfrom being the first-moveron new
technologies, which require R&Dresources, and/or from increasing
returns, say through learningas output increases or through positive
spillovers from one firm ina sector to another. In these modelscoun-
tries make their comparative advantageby investment decisions and
technological prowess. The Ricardianmodel developed by Gomory
and Baumol presents this analysisin a particularly useful way. In their
multi-sector model, advancedcountries compete for the most desirable
industries.36 There aremany possible free trade equilibria,some more
beneficial to a given country thanothers, so that gains toone country
can come at the expense of a competitor. Ifcountry A gains an edge in
a particular industry in which countries A andB are competing, A can
obtain higher GDP while B endsup with lower GDP because it has to
shift resources to lower valuedsectors. In this model and others of its
ilk, advanced countriescompete with advanced countries intechnol-
ogy (and other societal attributes), but not in lowcost labor. By contrast,
trade between advanced countriesand developing countries depends
on differences in factor proportions and invariablybenefits both coun-
tries. Countries with similar factorproportions have potential conffict-
ing national interests in their industrialoutput of traded goods while
countries with different factorproportions do not face such conflicts.
The North-South version of thetrade model postulates that the
advanced area (the North) has theskilled work force and R&Dcapabil-
ity to innovate new goods andservices, while the less advancedarea
(the South) cannot compete in theseareas (Krugman 1979). As a result
the North innovatesnew goods and trades them with the South, which
produces older goods as it gains thetechnology do so. Once thetworegions have access to the sametechnology, the lower wage South pro-
duces the good or service.Workers are higher paid in theNorth than in
the South both because they are moreskilled and because the North has
a monopoly onthe new products. More rapidtechnological advance
increases wages in the Northrelative to wages in the Southwhile more
rapid diffusion of technology hasthe opposite effect.37 In theseand other
trade models, a countrybenefits when a trading partner orpotential
trading partner improvestechnology in a sector in which thecountry
does not compete, but loseswhen another country improves itstech-
nology in a country's export sector.It is good for Alaska if ElSalvador
improves the technologyof banana productions but bad forNicaragua,
since the improved technologywill lower cost, increase banana pro-
duction, and reduce the priceof bananas on world markets. TheSouth
competes with the North forproduction of older productsthrough low
wages but is unable tocompete in the newest technology.
The increased supply ofscientific and engineering workers,includ-
ing doctorate researchersand others able to advancescientific and
technological knowledge in largedeveloping countries, threatens to
obsolesce this vision of tradebetween advanced and developing coun-
tries. It creates thepossibility of human resourceleapfrogging, in
which large populous developingcountries employ enough scientists
and engineers to competewith the advanced countries inthe high-tech
vanguard sectors that innovate newproducts and processes and thus to
threaten the North's monopolyin these sectors.
Three factors are necessary forhuman resource leapfrogging toshift
the comparative advantage inhigh tech industries from theNorth to
the South:
The Southern country mustbe sufficiently populous that ithas large
numbers of S&E workers eventhough it deploys only a relativelysmall
proportion of its work force in thosefields. From the perspective of the
U.S., there are only two countrieswith sufficiently large populations
that they could develop largerS&E work forces than the U.S.:China
and India.
Research and developmentproductivity depends on the numberof
scientific and engineering workersapplied to a problem. This seems
plausible as a broad generalization.The firm or country that allocates,
say, 2,000 engineers to aproject is likely to beat thefirm or country
that allocates 1,000 engineers tothe same project. But the way a coun-
try organizes its R&Dand the connection betweenresearch activities
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and business is also likelyto affect productivity. The close ties between
U.S. universities and businessand the well-developed systemof com-
petition for research funding arguablygives the U.S. an advantage in
turning research input into usefulcommercial output. Still, eventually
numbers may dominate organization.
3. The South has the productioncompetence to develop leading edge
commercial products even though thebulk of the Southern work force
is less skilled and the South lagsbehind the North in infra-structure.
Again, this is most likely in highlypopulous countries that could recruit
a substantial work force with any skill mix fromits huge pool of work-
ers and could develop the appropriateinfrastructure in selectedareas.
Under these circumstances,a populous developing country could
compete in high-tech sectors and do whatthe North-South trade mod-
els have assumed the South couldnot do: compete effectively in R&D
intensive high tech industries.Even if the developingcountry had
somewhat lower quality scientists andengineers or lacked some infra-
structure that gave its laboratories lowerproductivity than those in
advanced countries, it would havea cost advantage in R&D in terms of
lower wages for scientists andengineers, and would be able to employ
less costly production laborto produce the relevant commercialprod-
ucts. The promise by Cisco tomove its contract manufacturers to China
as it developed research facilities therepresumably reflects more than
the request of Chinese leaders,per the Chambers quote in endnote 26,
but also the potentially lowercost of producing in China.
Loss of comparative advantagein the high-tech sector toa low wage
competitor can substantially harman advanced country. The advanced
country would have to shiftresources to less desirable sectors, where
productivity growth through learningis likely to be smaller. Wages and
living standards would remainhigh in the advanced country becauseof
its skilled work force and infrastructure.But the monopoly rents from
new products or innovations would shift fromthe advanced country to
the poorer country. The magnitudeof the loss would depend inpart on
the number of persons workingin the advanced sector, and theirnext
best alternatives. If the lowwage country were to use its scientists and
engineers to take a global lead inspace exploration, there would be
little impact on theeconomy of the advanced country. The first human
on Mars would speak Chineseor Hindi rather than English. Students
interested in space explorationmight flock to the low wagecountry to
learn from the new scientific leaders.U.S. universities might contractorclose their space science departments,but the adverse economic effects
would be limited to that field.
Consider, by contrast, what wouldhappen if the low wage country
deployed its scientists and engineersto take a global lead in sectors
with sizeable employment andsignificant through-put to the restof
the economy. In this case, theeconomic losses to the advanced coun-
try could be substantial.They would be larger thanthose that might
occur if theadvanced country lost its technologicaladvantage to an
equally advanced competitor because wageswould have to fall more
to make another sectorcompetitive with the low wagecompetitor.38 In
the extremum, if the only reasonworkers in the North were paid more
than those in the South was thatthe North had a monopoly ininnovat-
ing new products, the Southwould effectively become the Northand
the North would become theSouth, reversing their relative positionsin
wages. Technologywould be a gold mine, andwhichever country pos-
sessed the mine would be wealthierthan the other.
Does the loss of technologicaladvantage to a lower wage coun-
try necessarily harm anadvanced country? Ron Jonesand Roy
Ruffin point out that under somecircumstances the loss of techno-
logical advantage could benefitthe advanced country. In theiranalysis,
the advanced country has anabsolute advantage in all sectors,and a
comparative advantage in thehigh tech sector. It loses this compara-
tive advantage so that it iscompletely wiped out as an exporterof
high tech. This turns the advancedcountry into an exporter ofthe lower
tech product. But it remains a high wagecountry and its living stan-
dards rise because the low wage countryproduces so much of the high
tech good at such low pricesthat the terms of trade improvefor the
advanced country with the shift incomparative advantage. TheU.S.
does better by producingapparel than by producing airplanes.This
scenario seems more of atheoretical curiosum than a realistic repre-
sentation of the current economicworld. It occurs only if the advanced
country has a large absoluteadvantage in the low technologyproduct,
which becomes its new exportproduct, as well as in the hightechnol-
ogy product; andthat the large populous countryhas a work force (pre-
sumably measured in effective skillunits) that is "much" larger than
that of the advanced country;39and does not give the high tech export
sector any of the special features(greater rates of learning andproduc-
tivity advance or economiesof scale; with high wage jobs)that makes
that sector particularly desirable.Loss of technological superiorityin a
particular sector to a low wagecompetitor might generate benefitsfor
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U.S. consun-lers, but loss oftechnological superiority overallis likely to
be disastrous for U.S. workersand firms.
Looking at the technologicaledge that the U.S. (and otheradvanced
countries) have relative to developingcountries from a differentper-
spective, Donald Davis and DavidWeinstein argue that the flowof
immigrants and foreign capitalinto the U.S. reduces U.S.well-being.
With more workers andcapital the U.S. expands theproduction of the
high tech goods in whichthe country has acomparative advantage,
which drives down the priceof those goods, and thus theearnings of
native workers and capital. In thismodel, if foreign born workersremain
overseas working with olderor less productive technology, theyare
weaker competitors for Americanworkers and firms. Theimplication
is that the U.S. could benefitfrom lower immigration andcapital flows.
My human resource leapfrogginganalysis differs from the Davisand
Weinstein analysis by makingtechnological superiority endogenousto
the supply of scientists andengineers, rather thanan exogenous given.
My analysis posits thatimmigrant scientists andengineers improve
U.S. technologicalcompetence and thus extend the North'slead in
technology, although theirsupply does reduce the earningsor oppor-
tunities for American scientistsand engineers. The humanresource
leapfrog model furtherassumes that the U.S. technologicalsuperiority
erodes as the foreign countries buildup their science and engineering
labor supplies, andas multinational firms locate where thosesupplies
are cost effective. From the perspectiveof U.S. workers, it is better for
U.S. workers to have immigrantsuse the newest technology in the U.S.
rather than having them developor use it overseas, where wages and
labor standards are lower.
Real Concerns or Paranoia:The Title Question
So, to what extent, if at all, doesglobalization of the scientific/engineer-
ing workforce threaten U.S.economic leadership?
While the increase in S&Eworkers in China, India, and otherlow
wage countries, as well as in Europe andJapan, is too recent to provide
a definitive answer to the title question,several indicators suggest that
the answer is:yes, this form of globalization threatens,for better or
worse, U.S. technological and economicleadership.
The first indicator is thatmajor high tech firmsare locating new
R&D facilities in China andIndia. This is not a matter ofdeveloping
products for the Chineseor Indian markets with littleexpectation thatFreeman
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the technology will beused for products in advancedcountries. Instead,
these facilities willproduce advances that will lead toproduction in
those countries for theglobal market. Microsoft'sAdvanced Technol-
ogy Center,which opened in Beijing in 2003,is expected to help the
company maintain itslead in technology and todevelop and test new
products.4°
A second indicator is theoffshoring of some forms ofskilled work.
If educated workers in low wagecountries can do similar tasks asedu-
cated workers in advancedcountries, firms will try tooffshore that
work to the lower wagelocale. While the U.S. governmentdoes not
measure the numberof jobs off shored, businessconsultants and busi-
ness leaders indicatethat the number is non-negligibleand growing
(see Hira and Hira 2005). Someexperts estimate that on theorder of
10-15 percent of employmentin the U.S. is potentiallyoff-shorable
(Bardhan and Kroll 2003). Fordiverse reasons, India has beenthe main
locale for the off-shoringof high level activity, buteventually China
will also attract jobs in these areas aswell. Advising companies how to
offshore is itself a growingindustry, with managementconsultants tell-
ing firms that they cangain as much as 40 percent morein profits from
selected activities.
Third, indices of technological prowessshow a huge improvement
in the technologicalcapability of China, in particular.Between 1993
and 2003, China closed partof the gap between it andthe U.S. and
Japan in the TechnologicalStanding Index that theTechnology and
Policy Assessment Unit atGeorgia Tech has developedfor the NSF (see
Exhibit 5.7).41 On a scale from1 to 100, China increasedits score from
20.7 in 1993 to 49.3 in 2003.Consistent with this, the GeorgiaTech group
found that China was fourthin the world, after the U.S.A,Japan and
Germany, in publications infour emerging technologies in1999; while
the NanotechnologyResearch Institute of Japanreported in 2004 that
China was third and closebehind Japan in publicationsand patents in
this area.4 In terms ofR&D spending on nano, Chinais fourth after the
U.S., Japan, and the EU taken as awhole, although monetarycompari-
sons are difficultgiven differences in pricesand potential effectiveness
of research facilities.
Finally, data on productionand exports of high techproducts shows
that the improved capabilityof China in high technologyhas begun to
show up in productionand sales on the globalmarket. From 1989 to
2001 the U.S. maintained a 31percent share of worldproduction in high
tech industries, as the U.S. economyoutperformed the EU and JapanDoes Globalization Threaten U.S.Economic Leadership? 147
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in these areas. But the U.S. marketshare of exports fell from 24percent
to 17 percent. The big gainer in theworld production and exportswas
China. Between 1989 and 2001 theratio of China's high tech outputto
the U.S.'s high tech outputrose from 7.1 percent to 27.3 percent.43 The
share of electronics, machinery,and transport equipment inChina's
exports increased from 18.1 percent in 1994to 42.9 percent in 2003, with
the export shares of office anddata processing equipment (including
computers and components) rising thegreatest percentage points. In
the first quarter of 2005, the ChineseMinistry of Commerce reported
84 billion U.s. dollars of foreigntrade of high-tech products,up 26.2
percent over the same period last year.43
In sum, research and technologicalactivity and productionare mov-
ing where the peopleare, even when they are located in the lowwage
"South." It is moving to China becauseChina is graduating hugenum-
bers of scientists and engineersand to India, as well, thoughmore
slowly.
V.Proposition 4: Adjustment Problemsand Policies for a New Era
As the number of scientists andengineers working in foreign countries
continues to increase, the U.S.'scomparative advantage in generating











0products associated with thatknowledge will decline. This will begood
for the world, as the spread ofmodern technologies to moreeconomies
will raise incomes in low incomecountries. Increased numbers of scien-
fists and engineers wifistimulate the growth of scientific andtechnical
knowledge and the rate of technologicaladvance, expanding the global
production possibility frontier.The U.S. will benefit from the greater
advance of new knowledge, thedevelopment of new goods and pro-
cesses, and from thereduced costs of products frominnovations and
products developed elsewhere.
But the U.S. will also faceeconomic difficulties as itstechnological
superiority erodes. What isgood for the world is not inevitablygood
for the U.S.. The group facingthe biggest danger from the lossof Amer-
ica's technological edge areworkers whose living standardsdepend
critically on America's technologicalsuperiority. The decline in monop-
oly rents from being the lead countrywill make it harder for the U.S. to
raise wages and benefits toworkers. The big winners from thespre:J
of technology will be workersin developing countries, andthe firms
that employ them, including manyU.S. multinational corporations.
In the long term, the spreadof knowledge and technologyaround the
world will almost certainlyoutweigh the loss of U.S. hegemonyin sci-
ence and technologyand make the U.S. better off. Butthe transition
period is likely to be lengthy anddifficultmore formidable than that
associated with the recovery of Europeand Japan after World War II.
The more similar the productiontechnologies and composition of out-
put in lower wage countriesbecomes to that of the U.S.,the greater will
be the downward pressures onU.S. wages.
To minimize the costs ofadjustment, the U.S. will have toconsider
new policies inthe labor market to distribute thenational product more
equitably and new policies in themarket for R&D and technology to
build on existing strengths tomaintain scientific and technicalleader-
ship in some sectors and toremain close to the frontier inother areas.
The country will also have tofind ways to take scientific andtechno-
logical advances from othercountries and turn them intoconunercial
products rapidly.
In the scientific and engineeringjob market, continued growthin the
supplies of highly talented youngpeople will stretch out the transition
period and maintain the U.S. as acenter of scientific andtechnological
excellence, albeit a less dominantcenter. The country coulddo this in
several ways. It could continue to encouragelarge numbers of foreign
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students and SE immigrants to study and work in the country, at the
cost of depressing incentives for domestic supply. If it does this, it ought
to think about policies to encourage these students and immigrants to
obtain permanent residence and citizenship quickly, to reduce the dan-
ger that they might return to their origin country and develop indus-
trial activities that compete with those in the U.S. At thesame time, the
country could seek to increase domestic supplies without discourag-
ing foreign students and immigrant, by giving more lucrative graduate
research fellowships (which go to U.S. students or residents only) and
improving opportunities to do independent research early ina career,
which is likely to increase U.S. supplies more than those from foreign
countries. From 1999 to 2005 NSF increased the value of its Graduate
Research Fellowship Award from $15,000 to $30,000. The number of
applicants nearly doubled as well, indicating a high elasticity of supply
to the awards. But the number of awards has not changed much since
the early days of the programs, so that in the 2000s approximately 1/3rd
as many NSF Fellowships were granted per S&E baccalaureate than in
the 1950s-1970s (Freeman, Chang, Chiang). An increase in the number
of awards at the new value of stipends could substantially increase the
supply of citizens choosing S&E studies.
On the demand side, the main tool that the U.S. government has to
affect S&E intensive activity is the nation's government spendingon
R&D. Some economists might view any policy to direct that spending
toward creating technological advantage in particular sectors as hav-
ing the flavor of an industrial policy (as Japan did with its MITT activ-
ity). This risks the government seeking to protect industrial losersor
rewarding political allies. But a policy for research and development
in new technologies is different than a policy of tariffs or subsidies. As
long as the government is the main source of support for basic research
directly through grants or indirectly through subsidization of universi-
ties, its expenditures already help set the technology and thus economy
of the future. The doubling of NIH research spending spurred the life
sciences, where increased knowledge will be more beneficial to biotech-
nical firms and the health industries than to most others. The National
Nano-tech Initiative wifi spur engineering and physical sciences, which
has the potential to benefit different sectors of the economy. On the other
hand, a shift in R&D from areas likely to benefit the civffianeconomy
toward military goals is likely to weaken U.S. technological superiority
in normal economic activity.150 Freeman
In adjusting to the globalization of science and engineering and the
diminishment of U.S. comparative advantage in high tech sectors, the
U.S. has some weaknesses. The country's social insurance system is
not well-developed for helping workers cope with apotentially long
period of transition. The country has the lowest safety net for workers
and the most expensive employment-linked health insurance system
among advanced countries. It has done arelatively poor job in educat-
ing lower skill persons and.. . you know the litany. But the country
also has some great strengths for absorbing the loss oftechnological
superiority in at least some sectors. The high mobility of the U.S.work
force should make some adjustments more palatable than ifAmeri-
cans were less willing to movelocation or change their occupation or
industry. American scientists and engineers collaborate regularly with
scientists and engineers in other countries. American universities are
more closely linked to business and the economythan those in other
countries. This should enable U.S. higher education to continue itsrole
in producing knowledge spillovers to industries in local areas,through
spin-offs or other forms of knowledge transfer.
If the country maintains or improves its efficiency in moving knowl-
edge from university labs to commercial products, the U.S. compara-
tive advantage in high technology sectors will be maintainedlonger
than would otherwise be the case. Speaking with a Harvard physicist,
whose most readily commercializable work was done collaboratively
with overseas scientist and engineers, I commented, "ah, so you are
helping them catch up with us," to which I received the reply, "no,they
are helping us keep ahead ofthem." The reason was that the U.S. side
of the collaboration found it easier to deal with industry and to attract
venture capital and business entrepreneurship. Empirically,U.S. firms
spend more on R&D relative to GDP than do EU firms and contribute
more to university research programs.While there are dangers with
business-university linkages, about which Derek Bok has warned us,
these links can help preserve leadership innovation and high tech even
as the U.S. share of world PhD researchersfalls.
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